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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he conflict in Ukraine has once again generated concerns that international humanitarian law (IHL) is insufficient to effectively regulate noninternational armed conflicts (NIACs). This concern is not unique to
Ukraine, but has been an almost constant feature of international reaction
to NIACs. Other recent examples including the conflicts in Syria, Libya
and Iraq, serve as reminders of what are arguably two axioms of these nonState conflicts. First, they tend to rapidly devolve into a level of brutality
that seems to know no rational limit. Second, IHL, developed primarily to
regulate inter-State armed conflicts, seems relatively incapable of addressing the realities of these conflicts in a manner that truly effectuates the goal
of mitigating the suffering of war.
There has been substantial progress since 1949 in filling what was at
that time a quite significant vacuum in the international legal regulation of
this historically pernicious category of armed conflicts. Unfortunately, routine images of the carnage associated with contemporary manifestations of
such conflicts—in particular the suffering inflicted on civilians—indicates
there is much work to be done to ensure that IHL’s humanitarian objectives are credibly advanced during NIACs.
There is no simple solution to the immense humanitarian challenge
produced by these conflicts. This is merely a reflection of the reality that
there is nothing straightforward about NIACs. Each conflict involves its
own set of unique strategic, operational and tactical complexities, with an
accompanying range of unique humanitarian challenges. However, IHL,
like all bodies of regulatory law, should evolve in response to what appear
to be consistent sources of regulatory and humanitarian failures associated
with these conflicts. While the list of factors that contribute to the gap between humanitarian aspiration and implementation is certainly well populated, one issue that merits particular attention is the challenge of mitigating
civilian risk resulting from the use of indirect fires and high-explosive projectiles.
Regulating the use of lethal combat power in order to mitigate risk to
civilians and civilian property is at the very core of IHL. And, the “fundamental” or “foundational” rules of IHL developed to regulate the use of
combat power apply today across the spectrum of conflict, conflicts that
range in nature from widespread hostilities between regular military forces
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of multiple States to lower level hostilities between State and non-State
forces, and even to hostilities between multiple non-State forces. In fact,
this migration of laws developed to regulate inter-State conflicts (international armed conflicts or IACs) to the NIAC domain is frequently and
quite appropriately lauded as one of the most significant contemporary advancements in humanitarian law. And yet the world continues to witness
NIACs where this migration appears to produce negligible positive effect.
How then can the regulatory and accordant humanitarian impact of this
migration be enhanced to better produce on a more consistent basis the
positive humanitarian outcomes the law is intended to achieve? The conflict in Ukraine provides the most recent, but by no means unique, lens
through which to consider this question. Like so many other similar “internal” armed conflicts, the hostilities in Ukraine involve some of the most
common attributes of NIACs: an eruption of violence among groups
whose animosities have been brewing for decades; an overall lack of military competence among the belligerents; questionable command commitment to humanitarian restraint; widespread availability of highly lethal
combat capabilities; and, most problematically, a situation that incentivizes
unrestrained uses of these lethal tools of war in an effort to win at all costs.
This article will focus on the perplexing question of improving the regulatory framework. First, it will consider how the incentives and disincentives inherent in NIACs, like that in the Ukraine, are heavily and problematically weighted against humanitarian restraint. Second, it will propose several approaches that may contribute to more effective NIAC regulation.
These proposals—a more effective incentive for IHL compliance, prompt
and credible criminal sanction for war crimes, and a more meaningful understanding of the meaning of reasonableness in relation to combat judgments—can build on existing law and regulation. However, they are not
suggested as a restatement of existing law, but instead as an evolution of
the extant rules to better address the NIAC challenge. Why do I believe
such evolution is essential? If conflicts like the one in Ukraine signal one
transcendent message, it is that in the context of NIACs, international law
has failed to produce a credible balance between the necessity to employ
deadly combat power and humanitarian protections for civilians and civilian property. With war an inevitable aspect of human relations, all too unpredictable in its permutations, but tragically all too predictable in its brutality, striving for such advances is as important today as it has ever been.
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II. R EGULATING NIAC H OSTILITIES : TWO “LONG POLES”1 IN THE
E FFECTIVENESS TENT
In 1996, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) issued its first judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadić,2 a judgment whose
shock effect continues to reverberate to this day. Most of the subsequent
attention to the judgment has focused on the Tribunal’s methodology for
assessing the existence of a NIAC, the oft-cited Tadić “elements” test.3
While this “Tadić test” for what qualifies as a NIAC was indeed a vital contribution to the interpretation and implementation of IHL, the Tribunal’s
methodology for assessing the substantive rules applicable to NIACs was
equally, and perhaps even more, significant in its impact on NIAC regulation.
Once the Tribunal determined that Tadić had been involved in a NIAC, it had to assess the substantive IHL rules that applied to that conflict;
the rules that proscribed his individual conduct as a belligerent participant
in the conflict.4 In one brief sentence, the Tribunal noted that many of the
IHL rules developed to regulate IAC had, over time, “migrated” to the
realm of NIAC.5 As a result, these rules had become binding on participants in any armed conflict, even though they were derived from treaties
applicable exclusively to IACs. Several armed forces had, prior to that time,
extended IAC rules to all military operations through adoption of national
IHL-related policies, ostensibly to provide a consistent and logical regulatory baseline for the training, planning and execution of any military operation.6 However, this was the first time this extension was characterized as a
1. See Definition of Long Pole, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://nws.merriamwebster.com/opendictionary/newword_display_alpha.php?letter=Lo&last=50 (last visited
May 18, 2015) (“The most important issue or problem that prevents or slows progress,
especially on a project. The factor that must be addressed before all others or that has the
most far-reaching effects.”).
2. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
3. Id.
4. Id., ¶¶ 580–83.
5. Id.
6. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The Need
to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 295, 315–20 (2006) (explaining the use of military policy directives to extend
LOAC principles to other military operations).
284

International Law Studies

2015

matter of law. In so doing, the ICTY initiated a process assessed by some
scholars as the merger of the law of IAC and NIAC.7
This merger was both logical and beneficial. NIACs, after all, routinely
involve belligerent hostilities of a nature that matched, and at times exceeded, the destructiveness associated with IACs. Common Article 3, while a
critically important extension of IHL into the NIAC domain, does not include any provisions that regulated the conduct of hostilities.8 The 1977
Additional Protocol II does include a very modest foray into the conduct
of hostilities field of regulation, but its Article 13 provisions for the protection of the civilian population are modest in comparison to the much more
comprehensive IAC conduct of hostilities regime.9 Furthermore, AP II is
not universally applicable to NIACs, but rather applies only after certain
triggering conditions are satisfied, most notably control of territory by the
party to the conflict (an insurgent or dissident force) challenging the government.10 Because of this very limited NIAC treaty-based conduct of hostilities regulation, extending IAC rules to NIACs seemed both logical and
essential to begin the process of better mitigating the humanitarian suffering produced by NIACs.
But this extension also reflected an important acknowledgment: despite
the theretofore inapplicability of IHL conduct of hostilities regulation to
NIACs, these armed conflicts involve military operations and hostilities
analogous to IACs. Indeed, it was the “intensity and duration” of hostilities
that the Tribunal identified as the key indicators that a situation had
7. See discussion in Andrew J. Norris & Kenneth Watkin, Preface to NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii, xxiii, xxxi
(Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
8. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II];
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
9. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
10. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ pdf
/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf.
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crossed the threshold from an internal civil disturbance to an armed conflict.11 Thus, the Tadić decision reflected two critical conclusions. First, NIACs, by virtue of being “armed conflicts,” involve uses of combat power.
Second, regulation of this combat power necessitates extending rules developed for IACs into the NIAC domain due to the lacunae of applicable
treaty regulation.12
Today, this unified applicability of IHL regulation—most notably in relation to the use of combat power to engage in hostilities—has become
almost axiomatic. IAC-based targeting rules apply to any armed conflict,
and provide the foundation for international criminal responsibility in both
IACs and NIACs. Yet, the record of humanitarian suffering produced during NIACs has not abated, but appears to be as unfortunate today as it was
at the time Tadić was decided. NIACs still occur; combat is as intense in
these conflicts as ever; civilians and civilian property are routinely caught in
the NIAC crossfire; indeed, humanitarian suffering seems to be an intractable problem produced during these conflicts.
This unfortunate reality must become a focal point of IHL evolution.
The record of humanitarian suffering associated with NIACs must continue to motivate efforts to better align what might be called the “Tadić aspiration” with NIAC reality. If nothing else, proponents of conflict regulation
must acknowledge that the gap between humanitarian aspiration and reality
continues to be unacceptably wide, and therefore new approaches to regulating NIACs must be considered.
The solution should build on the Tadić “rule migration,” but must also
be realistic. Proposals attenuated from the realities of armed conflict, proposals that fail to account for the fundamental objective of using force to
bring an opponent into submission, may be appealing from a humanitarian
perspective, but will likely produce negligible positive impact. In contrast,
once the causes of this overall failure to align aspiration with reality are better diagnosed, adjusting existing modalities to produce a more positive cure
may be feasible. Ultimately, the cure must be aligned with the underlying
foundation of IHL itself: providing belligerents realistic legal maneuver
space to enable effective execution of military operations while mitigating
more effectively the risk to civilians and civilian property.

11. Tadić, supra note 2, ¶¶ 564–65.
12. Id. ¶¶ 566–68.
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III. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES: HOW SOVEREIGNTY DILUTES THE
EFFICACY OF LEGAL REGULATION
Armed conflict of any nature involves mortal combat between organized
belligerent groups, what IHL characterizes as “parties to an armed conflict.”13 In any such situation, human nature will almost inevitably compel
individuals to adopt a “whatever it takes” approach to hostile confrontations. IHL often demands that individuals, when thrust into armed conflict,
subordinate this instinctual reaction, and at times even their instincts for
self-preservation, to the interests of collective good. This is a simple consequence of rules that require restraint in the conduct of hostilities. Ideally,
these restraints will produce a collective military advantage for the military
unit as a whole, even when they result in increased tactical level risk. Indeed, the overall benefit derived from imposing such restraints must, to
some extent, explain why so many nations have historically been willing to
subject their armed forces to IHL obligations.
Unfortunately, military forces and their commanders routinely underestimate the overall advantage that flows from compliance with rules that
require tactical and operational restraint. Even among the most sophisticated armed forces, developing combat units that embrace the “force multiplication”14 effect of IHL compliance is a genuine challenge. It should
therefore come as little surprise that armed groups involved in NIACs—
groups that often do not benefit from the training and developmental opportunities associated with sophisticated military organizations—are even
less likely to embrace IHL compliance based on advancing their own selfinterest.
This reality necessitates a more probing assessment of the practical incentives and disincentives for IHL compliance during NIACs. Such an assessment may provide a partial explanation for why the gap between aspiration and implementation remains so problematic, and may perhaps stimulate consideration of techniques to modify this incentive/disincentive equation.

13. Interview with Kathleen Lawand, Head of the Arms Unit, ICRC, What is a NonInternational Armed Conflict? (Oct. 12, 2012), ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/eng/re
sources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-international-armed-conflict.htm.
14. Raj Rana, Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-Military Relationship: Complementarity or
Incompatibility?, 86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 565, 567–68 (2004), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_855_rana.pdf.
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At the most fundamental level, the strategic end state of most NIACs
suggests a much more significant disincentive for IHL compliance than
exists in the IAC domain. IACs rarely involve a strategic objective of total
subjugation of an enemy State, with complete and permanent substitution of
authority over that State’s territory by the opposition force.15 Instead, IACs,
which since 1945 have become fewer and farther between than ever before
in modern history,16 tend to be short-duration conflicts with much more
limited strategic objectives. Even when IACs result in the total destruction
of an enemy armed force, such as the armed conflicts in Iraq in 2003 and
Panama in 1989, there is an almost immediate effort to restore governance
to host-nation authorities in order to extricate the victorious military forces
of the invading State.
The central strategic objective of IACs is the submission of enemy military resistance.17 However, this rarely includes the requirement for total
destruction of enemy armed forces. And, more importantly, a closely related strategic objective of most IACs is the rapid and efficient restoration of
peace, allowing for disengagement of armed forces and a return to peaceful
mechanisms for resolving the inter-State dispute. Thus, in a very real sense,
IACs have evolved into relatively short duration “flare ups” associated with
ongoing inter-State disputes that influence the broader diplomatic dispute
resolution process, but rarely completely displace that process.18
In order to advance what might be understood as this “de-escalation”
objective, humanitarian restraint is essential.19 Indeed, the dual objectives
of defeating enemy military resistance while facilitating a restoration of
peace highlights the logic of IHL, which itself seeks to balance military necessity with humanitarian restraint. History demonstrates that infliction of
unnecessary and gratuitous suffering—suffering not objectively justified by
15. Steven Pinker, The Decline of War and Conceptions of Human Nature, 15 INTERNASTUDIES REVIEW 400 (2013), available at http://stevenpinker.com/files/pinker
/files/intl_studies_review.pdf.
16. Kenneth Watkin, Humanitarian Law and 21st-Century Conflict: Three Block Wars, Terrorism, and Complex Security Situations, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 11 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale ed., 2006).
17. Kenneth Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflict in the 21st Century, 1
IDF LAW REVIEW 69, 70 (2003), available at http://hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files
/publications/Session2.pdf. This article was prepared as a background paper for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, held at Cambridge, January 27–29, 2003.
18. See id. at 12–13.
19. Id. at 16–17.
TIONAL
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military necessity—undermines the ultimate objective of restoring peace
while contributing little or nothing to the legitimate objective of defeating
enemy forces.20 It is therefore unsurprising that restoration of peace is
identified as one of the primary justifications for IHL compliance in the
U.S. Army’s 1956 field manual entitled “The Law of Land Warfare.”21
This closely related interest in rapid military success and restoration of
the peaceful status quo ante does not seem to extend to the NIAC domain.
Instead, the strategic end state of most NIACs is arguably quite different
from that of IACs. NIACs are normally fought to either effect a separation
of a portion of national territory from central governing authority, or to
replace that authority with a new governing authority.22 Examples of this
abound in recent history.23 Thus, “victory” is not defined in terms of defeating an enemy armed force and quickly withdrawing the victorious forces from the territory as part of a political solution to the inter-State dispute
that resulted in the military action. Instead, victory, and the accordant strategic end state, is normally defined in quite different terms. For the rebel or
insurgent forces, victory is defined in terms of total subjugation of government forces, leading to independence for a breakaway entity or substitution of the governing authority.24 For government forces, victory is defined
by total nullification of the capacity of the rebel or insurgent group to challenge the governing authority.25
Thus, in many cases, the very nature of the NIAC struggle undermines
the IHL compliance incentive equation. Unlike in the typical IAC, “peace
restoration” with a return to the status quo ante will rarely be perceived as a
20. Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the
Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 693,
740–41 (2013).
21. See Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 451 (1956).
22. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(1998).
23. See, e.g., Jake Diliberto, The New War Frontier: Understanding Modern Insurgency Wars
and the Syrian Civil War through the Iraq Insurgencies during 2006–2009, at 4 (APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, 2014) (discussing past military campaigns as a form of political revolt. It
further notes Jewish revolts against the Roman Empire, the French and Spanish guerrilla
campaigns, Mao Tse-tung’s people’s revolutions, and the French and British campaigns
within the Middle East and African Maghreb as political revolts.).
24. See generally id. at 7 (explaining that insurgent groups use violence as one of their
tools, but it is not their end goal and that the violence that they employ allows them to
gain and maintain political control).
25. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency II-21
(2013).
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central strategic goal, and therefore humanitarian restraint to contribute to
that outcome will be of minimal practical appeal. Because “total victory”
will normally be perceived as the essential and almost exclusive strategic
end state inherent in the nature of these armed conflicts, restraint will only
be perceived as logical if it contributes to that outcome, or if it provides
some other benefit for the belligerent parties.26
It is true that the negative consequences of unjustified violence—
alienation of civilians, increasing the resolve of resisting forces and international condemnation—should, in theory, apply to NIACs, thereby providing independent motivations for IHL compliance. However, the record of
these conflicts suggests this is not the common perception. And this can be
logically explained by two primary considerations. First, the external international scrutiny of the conduct of hostilities in NIACs seems generally to
be less exacting than in IACs.27 While this may be shifting in a positive direction, there is almost a sense that NIACs by their nature involve greater
levels of brutality, and that this expectation results in a higher level of tolerance for IHL non-compliance. Second, because total victory provides
parties to these conflicts the maximum protection from accountability for
wartime misconduct, there is little to no perceived benefit in complying
with any constraints that do not directly contribute to the total victory strategic end state.28
International criminal responsibility for IHL violations in NIACs has,
to a limited extent, altered this incentive equation. But the impact of international war crimes prosecutions for NIAC misconduct has arguably been
negligible. While there have been laudable efforts to ensure accountability
for NIAC IHL violations, the continuing propensity of participants in

26. Geoffrey S. Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means
Rule, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 536, 555–56 (2013).
27. Katharine Fortin, Does the Violence between Boko Haram and Nigerian Security Forces
Amount to a Non-International Armed Conflict?, ARMED GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Dec. 6, 2013), http://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2013/12/06/does-the-violencebetween-boko-haram-and-nigerian-security-forces-amount-to-a-non-international-armedconflict/ (the Nigerian government had to make changes to its approach due to increasing
international scrutiny).
28. Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri
Lanka, ¶¶ 83–86 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus
/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (eye witness account of heavy shelling resulting in the
killing and wounding of a large number of civilians in Sri Lanka where there was no accountability for wartime misconduct).
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these conflicts to commit widespread and serious IHL violations suggests
that these prosecutions have produced limited deterrent effect.
Enhancing respect for IHL during NIACs requires a major adjustment
to this incentive/disincentive equation. That adjustment should focus on
three factors. First, international law must provide a more effective—and
most importantly immediate—IHL compliance incentive for individual
belligerents and the commanders who lead them. It may be that some nonstate belligerent groups will never conform their conduct to IHL obligations. However, extending the opportunity to claim combatant immunity to
these groups holds the greatest potential for altering the existing compliance incentive equation, and therefore should be considered. Second, the
commitment to prompt, credible and effective criminal prosecutions for
serious IHL violations must not only be sustained, it must be increased.
Finally, in addition to these compliance enhancement measures, more attention should be devoted to providing greater clarity to the assessment of
reasonableness in relation to operational judgments—a standard that must
frame legitimacy in combat and accountability for alleged unlawful judgments. As will be discussed in Part IV, this touchstone for assessing the
lawfulness of operational judgments should be better defined in relation to
the use of means and methods of warfare that pose immense risk of civilian harm.
A. Sovereignty, Combatant Immunity and Incentivizing IHL Compliance
Combatant immunity, or the so-called lawful combatant’s privilege, is fundamentally connected with the IAC IHL compliance equation. Since the
inception of modern treaty-based regulation of inter-State hostilities, international law provided belligerents “qualified” as lawful combatants with the
legal privilege to engage in hostilities. That privilege was not, however, absolute. Instead, it was contingent on compliance with certain qualification
requirements. Most notably for purposes of this analysis, these included the
requirement to belong to an organization that conducts operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war and operates under responsible
command.29 Even when properly qualified so as to “earn” the combatant’s
privilege, only conduct that complies with IHL falls within this scope of
the privilege, resulting in criminal responsibility for conduct that exceeds
the legally recognized necessities of war.
29. GC III, supra note 8, art. 4A2.
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This privilege/immunity construct incentivizes IHL compliance in a
number of relatively obvious ways. First, it protects individual belligerents
from criminal/punitive sanction for their conduct of hostilities, but only
when their conduct complies with IHL. Second, it facilitates deterrence for
IHL violations by emphasizing the consequences of crossing the line from
justified to unjustified wartime conduct. Third, it imposes an obligation on
military leaders to prepare subordinates to conduct IHL compliant operations in order to satisfy the collective qualification requirement of operating
under “responsible command.” Fourth, it contributes to a collective sense
of military professionalism by providing an objective manifestation of the
legal sanction for violent wartime conduct, but only conduct that complies
with IHL. Finally, and perhaps much more subtly, it provides individual
belligerents with a moral touchstone to aid in navigating the brutality of
hostilities, thereby contributing to the internalization of respect for IHL. In
short, compliance with IHL at the individual and collective unit level provides an objective indication of legitimacy by protecting individuals from
accusations of unlawful conduct, whereas non-compliance exposes the individuals and their units to legal condemnation for engaging in illegitimate
wartime violence.
This equation is inapplicable to the NIAC domain. In fact, lawful combatant status and its accordant combatant immunity is one of the few remaining aspects of IHL that is limited to IACs. From a humanitarian perspective, this may seem perplexing: why should the nature of the armed
conflict dictate applicability of this legal qualification and inherent reward
for IHL compliance? The answer seems to be rooted in the prioritization
of sovereignty over humanitarian protection. This is a topic I addressed
extensively in an earlier writing,30 but it necessitates a summary here in relation to this discussion of IHL compliance incentives.
Extending lawful combatant status to a belligerent opponent obviously
deprives the capturing State of the prerogative of punishing the individual
for participation in hostilities. In the context of IACs, this is a compromise
of sovereign prerogative States have long been willing to accept. The justifications seem manifold, but ostensibly include enhancing protection for
the State’s own military personnel, enhancing the likelihood of IHL compliance (due to the compliance qualification requirement) and protecting
30. Geoffrey Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW 253 (2011) [hereinafter
Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable], available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2147corn--thinking-the-unthinkable--has-the-time-come.
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individual soldiers from sanction for complying with the orders of their
sovereign State, orders they rarely have the option to disobey. In short,
combatant immunity reflects the recognition that an IAC is a State prerogative, and therefore so long as the individual soldier is acting as an agent of
the State and complying with the international laws adopted by the State,
international law should shield the individual from punitive sanction for
participation in hostilities.
This equation is fundamentally different in the NIAC context. Unlike
conflict in the international domain, during NIACs the State claims a monopoly on legal authority to impose its will on its people through the force
of arms. This authority is not unlimited, and is qualified and regulated by
both the State’s domestic law, and international human rights obligations
applicable to the State’s activities. But unlike an IAC, there is no basis to
conclude that a non-State armed opposition group shares a legal authority—and accordant privilege—to engage in hostilities against the State. As a
result, extending lawful combatant status and combatant immunity to nonState armed groups would result in a much more significant intrusion into
State sovereignty than its application in IACs. From the perspective of the
State, these individuals did not take up arms as agents of a sovereign equal,
but instead in contravention of the most fundamental duty of citizenship:
loyalty to the State. It should therefore be no surprise that States have been
unwilling to extend combatant immunity to the NIAC domain, as doing so
would deprive the State of the authority to criminally sanction those who
take up arms in violation of this obligation.
This presents an odd dilemma: if lawful belligerent qualification and accordant combatant immunity is limited to IACs, what is the legal status of
government forces engaged in a NIAC? Some experts have quite properly
challenged the assumption that these forces are, like their IAC counterparts, vested with lawful combatant status.31 These challenges are quite
credible, as this status is linked to prisoner of war qualification, which, in
turn, cannot exist in NIACs. It is probably more accurate to conclude that
government forces are vested with a type of State immunity for lawfully
executing the laws of the State, just as police officers are granted a legal
privilege to use force within the limits of applicable domestic and international law. Of course, the existence of an armed conflict will necessarily
expand the scope of permissible conduct for these State forces beyond that
31. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 (2010), available at http://www.vjil.org/assets
/pdfs/vol50/issue2/VJIL-50.2-Watts.pdf.
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normally permissible for police personnel. Thus, so long as State forces act
within the framework of the applicable legal regime—in peacetime, domestic law and international human rights law, with an IHL-based expansion
during NIACs—they benefit from State derived immunity.
Whether considered lawful combatants or State agents acting within
the scope of their legal privilege, government forces obviously stand in a
more favorable legal position than their non-State counterparts during NIACs. But the ultimate benefit of their status as State agents is contingent on
the government prevailing in the struggle. If the non-State opposition forces prevail and are able to impose their will on the existing government, either by establishing regional independence or by overthrowing government
authority, the domestic legal advantage of government forces may be nullified and insurgent forces will reap the benefit of the legal immunity that
will almost certainly flow from victory. Thus, unlike IAC participants who
benefit from an equitable application of both legal privilege and legal obligation, NIAC participants face a genuine “all or nothing” equation: those
belonging to the victorious party will reap practical immunity for their wartime conduct by the governing authority on whose behalf they fought, and
the forces of the losing party will face the risk of legal condemnation and
punitive sanction for their participation in the hostilities.
IHL and international criminal law have attempted to modify this equation by imposing international criminal accountability upon all parties to
NIACs regardless of which party prevailed in the conflict. In fact, accountability efforts have even commenced during the struggle when the outcome
of conflict was far from certain. But the impact of these efforts, as noted
above, has not seemed to have significantly altered this incentive/disincentive equation. In short, unlike participants in an IAC, armed
groups in NIACs have a much more tangible self-interest in total victory:
an outcome that will substantially reduce the risk that conduct during the
armed conflict will become the subject of legal investigation, prosecution
and punitive condemnation. The persuasive impact of potential secondand third-order consequences of IHL violations—alienation of the civilian
population, increased resistance among opponents and international condemnation—will therefore be degraded by the compelling incentive for
total victory.
At the most basic level, all of this boils down to a simple question: why
should a NIAC armed group commit to IHL compliance? Unless such
commitment will produce an immediate and obvious contribution to total
victory, there is minimal incentive to do so. Even worse, because leaders
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and members of such armed groups will often perceive IHL compliance as
impeding their ability to achieve total victory—the outcome that provides
the greatest probability of immunity for their wartime conduct—
compliance will be perceived as illogical. One need only consider the brutality of those groups engaged in the Syrian NIAC to illustrate this point.
Incentivizing IHL compliance in NIACs, as in IACs, will never be an easy
task; however, the painfully obvious humanitarian risk inherent in NIACs
compels reconsideration of the balance between sovereignty and humanity
inherent in the inapplicability of combatant immunity during NIACs.
Extending this immunity to NIACs, if linked to requirements that incentivize IHL compliance, could fundamentally alter the existing incentive/disincentive equation. Belligerent forces belonging to all parties to a
NIAC, and perhaps more importantly their leaders, would know from the
outset of hostilities that IHL respect will reap a significant individual and
collective benefit: protection from punitive sanction, no matter what the
outcome of the conflict. Perhaps more importantly, the risk of punitive
sanction for participation in the conflict will be limited to accountability for
IHL violations, potentially enhancing the deterrent effect. Instead of the
current situation where sanction is a risk inherent in defeat, the key to legal
immunity, and by implication the legitimacy of individual and collective
military operations, will be IHL compliance.
As I noted in my earlier writing, extending combatant immunity to
NIACs will be no panacea, and its impact on respect for IHL would almost
certainly be incremental.32 But doing so would more effectively and rationally align the benefits of compliance with the consequences of noncompliance by limiting criminal liability to IHL violations. In so doing,
such an extension would enhance the symmetry between IHL aspiration
and implementation, and would render condemnation for IHL violations
more meaningful. This is because these condemnations would, unlike today, be based on an underlying premise that IHL compliance produces an
individual reward. Thus, the moral invalidity of IHL violations is exacerbated precisely because IHL would not only provide the legal basis to subject the individual to sanction, but would also provide the legal basis to
grant the individual a reward for compliance.
The beneficial impact of extending combatant immunity to NIACs
would be contingent on the feasibility and probability that non-State belligerents comply with IHL qualification requirements. As explained in my
32. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 30, at 263–68.
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previous writing, it is likely that this extension may fail to produce an increased commitment to LOAC compliance. The very nature of NIACs
suggests that wearing distinctive symbols recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly and restricting hostilities to lawful objects of attack may all
be counter-intuitive to insurgent tactics.33 But this is not always the case,
and at least offering non-State belligerents the opportunity to reap the compliance immunity reward would provide non-State group leaders with an
incentive to transition into operations that allow for compliance with these
requirements. And, as noted above, should they fail to comply, their operations would be discredited in a more meaningful way, precisely because of
the benefit offered in exchange for these IHL compliance measures.
Even acknowledging the inherent limitations on how effective such an
extension might be for enhancing IHL respect in the NIAC domain, the
simple truth is that it would improve, even modestly, the IHL compliance
incentive structure that currently exists. The price for such an extension
would be the compromise to sovereignty resulting from an inability to punish non-State actors for participating in hostilities against the State.34 This is
not insignificant, and, indeed, has been the primary obstacle preventing this
extension when previously proposed.35 But the evolution of NIAC law
since 1949 reflects a continuing shift of priority from protection of sovereignty to humanitarian protection.36 Accordingly, extending an IAC concept to NIACs in order to prioritize humanitarian protection over the sovereign prerogative to sanction NIAC participants is consistent with this
trend. Therefore, more effort must be devoted to extending the IAC quid
pro quo—exchanging IHL compliance measures for the promise of combatant immunity—to the NIAC domain.
B. Doubling Down on War Crimes Accountability
Extending combatant immunity to NIAC participants will provide a more
meaningful incentive for IHL compliance. However, the compliance equation must also be addressed from the other end of the spectrum: enhancing
the disincentive for IHL violations. Because of the very real risk that forces
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., GC III, supra note 8, art. 87.
35. See MARCO SASSÓLI, TRANSNATIONAL ARMED GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 22–23 (2006). See also Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 30,
at 265.
36. See Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable, supra note 30, at 265–66.
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engaged in NIACs will perceive IHL compliance as an impediment to
achieving their strategic end state of total victory, the importance of deterring IHL violations through a meaningful risk of criminal accountability is
arguably more significant in relation to NIACs than even in IACs.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to ignore the reality that the deterrent effect of criminal accountability for NIAC IHL violations has been undermined by the complexity of bringing these cases to trial.37 There has certainly been a laudable commitment of substantial resources in pursuit of
international accountability for serious IHL violations in NIACs (such as
those in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Rwanda and Cambodia).38 However, the record of brutality in contemporary NIACs continues to shock the world. While these efforts have made substantial positive
contributions to the general concept of individual criminal responsibility
for NIAC war crimes, the cumbersome process of advancing cases from
investigation to conviction and punishment has arguably diluted their deterrent effect. Other alternatives, such as hybrid tribunals and reliance on
domestic tribunals, represent an improvement to the status quo,39 although
it is yet to be seen if the deterrent effect of the law will be substantially enhanced by these efforts.
Deterrence is not the exclusive purpose of criminal accountability.
However, in relation to NIACs, deterrence resulting from a meaningful risk
of criminal sanction for IHL violations provides an especially important
disincentive to ignore the law. And, when connected with the doctrine of
command and superior responsibility, this deterrent effect also offers an
important incentive for leaders to discharge their duty to ensure subordinates conduct IHL compliant operations. Reducing the existing disparity
between prosecutable IHL violations and ultimate sanction for such violations will enhance the deterrent effect of international criminal law. Because there are so few disincentives for non-compliance with IHL in NIACs, this seems especially important in seeking to enhance the protection
of potential war victims.
37. See Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Summer 1993, at 122, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48962/theodormeron/the-case-for-war-crimes-trials-in-yugoslavia (discussing the complications involved
with bringing a case before the ICTY).
38. See U.N. Documentation: International Law, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES, http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last updated May 9, 2015)
(listing all international courts and tribunals).
39. See Criminal Justice, ICTJ, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justiceissues/criminal-justice (last visited May 11, 2015).
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While a comprehensive discussion of steps that might contribute to
achieving this objective is beyond the scope of this article, three seem especially relevant. First, there should be a conscious and deliberate movement
away from reliance on international tribunals in favor of national invocation of universal jurisdiction to bring NIAC war criminals to account. Second, the widely held assumption that civilian tribunals are the best, if not
exclusive, forum to adjudicate accusations of IHL violations should be reconsidered. Finally, there should be a greater willingness to recognize and
accept that acquittals in war crimes prosecutions are not necessarily manifestations of accountability failures or validations of the alleged misconduct.
International criminal tribunals have—and must continue to play—an
important role in accountability for war crimes in both IACs and NIACs.
However, most likely because of the high profile nature of the establishment and use of such tribunals in the past several decades, there seems to
be a tendency to view these tribunals as the forum of choice for war crimes
prosecutions. This is not only inconsistent with the International Criminal
Court’s (ICC) foundational complementarity principle;40 it is also unfortunate. It is unfortunate because this assumption may be diluting the interest
and willingness of individual States to leverage their own legal systems to
bring war criminals to account.
Nor is the concept of complementarity—a concept central to the credibility of the ICC41—an adequate response to the concern that States are
unwilling to leverage their criminal jurisdiction to contribute to NIAC accountability. Complementarity focuses almost exclusively on the interaction
of the ICC and States vis-à-vis accountability for their own nationals.42
While this concept anticipates that States will perceive a substantial interest
in utilizing their own legal systems to adjudicate war crimes accusations
40. See Complementarity, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=complementarity (last visited May 11, 2015).
What was envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute was not simply a selfstanding Court, but rather a comprehensive system of international justice,
where the duty on States Parties to investigate and prosecute international
crimes is clearly reinforced. Consequently, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) is a court of “last resort” and will step in where national jurisdictions
have failed to address international crimes.

Id.

41. See id.
42. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: A MANUAL 119 (2013).
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against their nationals, it does not address the broader issue of States exercising universal jurisdiction43 to contribute to accountability for NIAC war
crimes committed by individuals with whom they have no nationality or
territorial connection.
Broader commitment to exercising this type of jurisdiction over individuals suspected of committing serious IHL violations during NIACs
could contribute—potentially significantly—to mitigating the proverbial
“flash to bang” time between violations and accountability. Enhancing
prosecutorial efficiency will inevitably contribute to general deterrence, as
individuals will perceive a more direct relationship between their wartime
misconduct and potential sanction. While exercising universal jurisdiction
over such individuals is politically and diplomatically sensitive, the substantial evolution of the internationally accepted scope of NIAC war crimes
liability, most notably in the form of the crimes adopted in the ICC Statute,
arguably mitigates these concerns. This enumeration supports the credibility of exercising universal jurisdiction by helping limit the potential variance
between different States’ prosecution of war crimes to matters of procedure rather than the substance of the crimes.44 And, assuming State criminal process complies with fundamental international human rights obligations, no defendant should be denied a fair trial.
There are also substantial logistical and practical impediments to asserting universal jurisdiction in relation to NIACs that have no connection
with the prosecuting State. But when an individual suspected of serious
NIAC war crimes is found within the jurisdiction of another State, asserting universal jurisdiction will contribute to general deterrence by signaling
to potential war criminals that their future jeopardy is not linked exclusively
to the inclination of their own State to hold them to account. In an era
when movement of peoples between national borders is more significant
than ever before, States should devote greater attention to establishing the
necessary domestic legal frameworks for exercising such jurisdiction.
This leads to the second issue: reconsidering the widespread assumption that war crimes should, or even must, be prosecuted by civilian tribu-

43. For an explanation of universal jurisdiction, see William A. Schabas, Punishment of
Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 907, 913–14 (2002), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/view content.cgi?article=1888&context=ilj.
44. See generally id. at 918–22 (explaining the evolution of criminal liability for IHL violations committed by non-State actors, using Sierra Leone as an example).
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nals.45 While there is no legal or practical invalidity to the use of civilian
tribunals to adjudicate war crimes accusations, there is also no reason to
assume that military tribunals are unable to contribute to this accountability
effort. Unfortunately, the widespread assumption that military jurisdiction
cannot be exercised in a fundamentally fair manner has not only contributed to the assumed necessity of reliance on civilian tribunals, but has also
led many States to eliminate military criminal jurisdiction altogether.46
This is unfortunate. Military tribunals have played a central role
throughout history in war crimes accountability.47 This is unsurprising, as
IHL violations at their core involve breaches of standards of professional,
disciplined and honorable military conduct. Military tribunals arguably possess a high level of competence to adjudicate accusations of war crimes
precisely because they are composed of members of the profession of
arms. When established pursuant to a legal framework that guarantees the
accused individual will receive a fundamentally fair trial in adjudicating accusations of internationally accepted criminal proscriptions, these tribunals
can make a significant contribution to accountability efforts. Indeed, their
competence in the military operational art may actually contribute to greater overall efficiency in the adjudication process, and the credibility of outcomes.
Finally, advancing the interests of both conflict regulation and war
crimes accountability means the international community must be more
willing to accept acquittals when prosecuting alleged war criminals. There
must be increased recognition and acknowledgment that while IHL plays a
vital role in both the regulation of hostilities and accountability for war
crimes, its function in these two domains is distinct.48 Standards of compli45. See, e.g., Eugene R. Fidell, International Commission of Jurists Condemns Pakistani Military Courts Legislation; NYT Coverage, GLOBAL MILITARY JUSTICE REFORM (Jan. 11, 2015),
http://globalmjreform.blogspot.com/2015/01/international-commission-of-jurists.html.
46. See Viara Z. Marshall, Civilian Courts vs. Military Courts in the Democratic State, NEW
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Feb. 21, 2007), https://vzmarshall.wordpress.com/2007/02/21/
civilian-courts-vs-military-courts-in-the-democratic-state/.
47. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE., RL32458, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND LESSONS (2004), available at http://www.
isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c
7060233&lng=en&id=10339; then follow “English” hyperlink (summarizing the history
of military tribunals in America).
48. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Ensuring Experience Remains the Life of the Law: Incorporating
Military Realities into the Process of War Crimes Accountability, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY:
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 2015) [hereinaf300
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ance in the regulatory domain will not always align with standards to establish criminal culpability in the accountability domain.49 Hence there will be
situations where acts contrary to IHL’s regulatory framework do not result
in criminal liability. Failing to recognize this legal reality and conflating the
function of the law in these distinct domains risks serious negative consequences.
First, prosecutors must be willing to bring hard cases to trial. Establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, especially in relation to complex operational judgments, is a daunting task. If prosecutors and the States they
serve are unwilling to accept the risk of acquittals, they will be inclined to
gravitate towards only the most blatant war crimes. Because targeting
judgments will rarely fall within this category, this may produce an “accountability gap” into which most conduct of hostilities incidents will fall.
If enhancing protection against the harmful effects of highly destructive
combat power, most notably artillery and other indirect fire systems, is an
important objective of IHL compliance, these cases must be pursued when
there is credible evidence indicating a violation. However, because evidentiary uncertainty will and must always favor the accused in a war crimes
prosecution50—an axiomatic consequence of the presumption of innocence
and the burden of proof—prosecutors and the broader international community must accept the difficulty in proving such cases and the inherent
risk of acquittals.
Second, tribunals must be alert to the risk that the standard of proof to
convict might be subtly diluted in order to facilitate outcomes. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt—the internationally accepted standard of proof
required to rebut an accused’s presumption of innocence51—must define
the applicability of IHL standards in the criminal accountability domain.
Tribunals adjudicating war crimes allegations, especially in relation to complex operational judgments, must be true to this standard and avoid the
temptation to substitute a regulatory standard of compliance for this criminal axiom. Conflating the function of the law in these distinct domains
risks undermining the credibility of war crimes outcomes, which in turn
will undermine the deterrent effect of the law. In short, acquittals based on
a failure to meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will
ter Corn, Life of the Law], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2547328 (manuscript at 9–12).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 7–8.
51. See id. at 8.
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contribute more to accountability than convictions based on an implicit
dilution of that standard in order to offset the inherent uncertainty associated with operational—and especially targeting—judgments.
In many ways, the ICTY’s controversial decision in Prosecutor v.
Gotovina52 illustrates these risks. From the perspective of those supporting
General Gotovina, the Trial Chamber’s determination to convict him led to
a substitution of a regulatory standard for the criminal burden of proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.53 From the perspective of those supporting the Trial Chamber’s judgment, the imposition of an acquittal by the
Appeals Chamber signaled a problematic endorsement of the manner in
which Gotovina employed indirect fires during Operation Storm.54 There is
probably merit in both critiques. Having been closely associated with the
defense effort, I continue to believe that the acquittal was a proper application of a criminal standard of proof, that the totality of the evidence did not
exclude every fair and rational hypothesis other than guilt. However, this
should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the overall tactical and operational employment of indirect fires during that operation. From a regulatory perspective, it is relatively easy to identify measures that could have
enhanced both the legality and efficacy of the use of these weapon systems.
Ultimately, the case ought not to be viewed as a failure of the accountability process, but instead as an example of the complexity of translating regulatory targeting rules into the basis for a criminal conviction. Only by trying
cases such as this, with all the inherent risks of acquittal, will complex targeting judgments be subjected to meaningful accountability.

52. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases
/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf.
53. See Robert Chesney, Transatlantic Dialogue on Int’l Law and Armed Conflict: Geoff Corn
on Battlefield Regulation and Crime, LAWFARE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.lawfareblog.com
/2014/09/transatlantic-dialogue-on-intl-law-and-armed-conflict-geoff-corn-on-battlefieldregulation-and-crime/.
54. See Gary D. Solis, The Gotovina Acquittal: A Sound Appellate Course Correction, 215
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 78, 81 (2013), available at https://www.jagcnet.army mil/DOC
LIBS/MILITARYLAWREVIEW.NSF/0/17ecb457e9eff74285257bf0005a5903/$FILE/
By%20Gary%20D.%20Solis.pdf. Solis quotes former ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del
Ponte as saying, “I am shocked, very surprised and astonished because it is absolutely unbelievable . . . . I cannot accept that. I am really shocked because this is not justice.” Id.
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IV. ALLOWING CHILDREN TO PLAY WITH BIG KID TOYS—THE USE OF
INDIRECT FIRES AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES IN NIACS
The Gotovina case also provided an example of what is emerging as a focal
point of NIAC IHL concern: protecting civilians from the effects of artillery and other indirect fire weapon systems.55 Because NIACs frequently
involve combat in densely populated areas, the question of how to enhance
protection of civilians exposed to the risk of such methods and means of
warfare is indeed particularly urgent. How the law evolves to address the
use of these weapon systems in areas placing civilians at risk is therefore
likely to increase as a focal point of international legal and public attention.
The conflict in Ukraine—most notably destruction caused by the use of
rocket artillery56—has been particularly significant in focusing attention on
this issue.
More effective regulation of indirect fires in NIACs is inevitably complex and multi-faceted. Many observers believe that the status quo must be
reconsidered, with an increasing number of experts calling for a complete
prohibition against use of these weapon systems in populated areas.57 Such
use by belligerent groups in NIACs has unquestionably raised concerns
about the ability of the law to balance the interests of military necessity and
humanitarian protection. But a ban is not the solution. Any evolution of
the law to respond to the risk to civilians created by indirect fires must be
responsive to both military and humanitarian concerns; responsiveness that
will be central to the credibility and efficacy of this evolution.
Any effort to improve the legal regulation of indirect fires in NIACs
must begin with an important, although for many frustrating, acknowledgment: belligerents will always seek to leverage the means of warfare they
possess to produce optimal tactical and operational effects. While this
might seem obvious, proposals to completely ban the use of indirect fires
in population centers reflect a distortion of the central balance of IHL in-

55. Id. at 106.
56. See Oleg Orlov, Ukraine’s Forgotten City Destroyed by War, THE GUARDIAN (London)
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/-sp-ukraine-pervomaisk
-luhansk-forgotten-city-destroyed-by-war.
57. See, e.g., Maya Brehm, Use of Grad Rockets in Populated Areas: What Lessons from
Gotovina?, EJIL: TALK! (July 30, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/use-of-grad-rockets-inpopulated-areas-what-lessons-from-gotovina/.
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terests.58 No one can dispute the risk to civilians created by such use, but
NIACs are an increasingly urban form of warfare for the simple reason that
operational centers of gravity are routinely co-mingled with civilian populations.59 Because of this, belligerents will seek—indeed often must seek—to
leverage their combat power against targets mixed among the civilian
population. In short, population centers are and will continue to be the tactical focal point of combat operations during both IACs and NIACs. So
there is no question that efforts to enhance the civilian protection effect of
IHL in relation to the use of indirect fires in population centers are laudable, but advocating for a complete ban is unrealistic and potentially counterproductive. The challenge is how to achieve this goal?
It should already be obvious that proposals to completely ban such use
are not, in the opinion of this author, the answer. In fact, such an approach
to advancing protection of civilians is so misguided that it risks doing more
damage than good. Instead, the focal point of this effort should be on enhancing the efficacy of existing IHL targeting rules, with a particular emphasis on the targeting touchstone of reasonableness. By providing greater
clarity to the substantive meaning of this term—especially in the context of
NIACs and in relation to the use of indirect fires—commanders will be
better informed about the nature of IHL constraints and the broader international community will be better able to credibly critique and, where appropriate, condemn use of these weapon systems.
A. Banning Use of Indirect Fires in Populated Areas
The harm inflicted upon civilians and civilian property by the use of indirect fires in populated areas—the central and decisive issue in the Gotovina
case60—has generated a growing movement to restrict or prohibit such
use.61 This movement is motivated by not only the undeniable destructive
58. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the
LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 337, 366–70
(2012), available at http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/47/num2/Corn337.pdf.
59. See, e.g., Raymundo B. Ferrer & Randolph G. Cabangbang, Non-International Armed
Conflict in the Philippines, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 263, 273 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies) (“In their operations, communist guerillas
are known to mingle with civilians.”).
60. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 1169, 1172,
1175, 1188–89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011).
61. See Brehm, supra note 57.
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effect of high explosive projectiles when used in populated areas, but also
by the perception that the existing IHL targeting framework is too vague
and uncertain to provide meaningful and effective regulation of these
weapon systems.62 One report proposes to generally limit the use of these
weapons in densely populated areas.63
A complete prohibition against use of artillery and other indirect fire
weapons in populated areas may seem appealing from the perspective of
humanitarian protection, but it is unrealistic and potentially counterproductive. Banning the use of weapon systems that are widely available
and operationally appealing in a particular context presents immense enforceability problems. Indirect fires offer belligerents immense tactical and
operational value in any context. Although it is beyond the scope of this
article to address this value in depth, suffice it to say that every military organization in modern history—both State and non-State—has sought to
possess these weapons and to leverage their power during conflict; indeed,
such weapon systems are colloquially known in the U.S. military as the
“King of Battle.”64 This simple reality, coupled with the reality that indirect
fire systems are routinely available to even emerging belligerent groups,
makes it difficult to imagine how the international community could compel respect for a complete ban.
Enforceability is not the only consideration that undermines the credibility of the total or even partial ban approach. Overall, it is just one of four
especially significant flaws with either option. First, unlike other means of
warfare that have been subject to complete bans—most notably chemical
weapons65—a ban on the use of indirect fire weapons in only certain contexts will not result in eliminating these weapons from the arsenals of potential belligerents. Instead, armed forces and other organized armed
62. See John Borrie & Maya Brehm, Enhancing Civilian Protection from Use of Explosive
Weapons in Populated Areas: Building a Policy and Research Agenda, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 809, 820–21 (2011), available at https://www.icrc.org
/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-883-borrie-brehm.pdf.
63. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 40–42
(2011), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement
/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf.
64. BOYD L. DASTRUP, KING OF BATTLE: A BRANCH HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY’S
FIELD ARTILLERY (1992), available at http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/7027/cmhPub_70-27.pdf.
65. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S.
317.
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groups will continue to develop, procure and use these weapons where
permissible even if a partial ban were implemented. How would compliance with a “use only” ban be effective when armed forces would constantly have access to a weapon system that offers such immense potential operational advantage in any context? Indirect fires are used to produce effects; where these effects must be produced is always dictated by a range of
operational considerations, including friendly capabilities and enemy disposition.66 Restricting use in certain areas is inconsistent with this most fundamental military logic, because it makes one consideration dispositive and
ignores the possibility that the most decisive targets might be located in the
most restricted area immune from any other feasible alternative attack option. The proclivity of belligerents engaged in modern conflicts to use indirect fires in both populated and sparsely populated areas indicates that effects-based employment cannot turn on arbitrary geographic constraints,
and demonstrates ultimately how unrealistic such an expectation is. In
short, it is almost impossible to imagine that military commanders are going to forego the advantages offered by indirect fires when the alternatives
are operationally ineffective. Instead, their instincts and the pressures of
mission accomplishment will compel the exact opposite approach.
Second, a complete prohibition against the use of indirect fires in
populated areas will almost inevitably invite disparate application between
advanced and less-advanced armed forces, leading to a perception of inconsistent and hypocritical obligations. Modern militaries covet combat
capabilities that allow for stand-off precision engagement of enemy targets.
It is also a virtual axiom of contemporary asymmetrical warfare that they
expect their less competent opponents to utilize every available technique
to offset the inherent military advantage offered by advanced weaponry
and target acquisition systems, which routinely includes co-mingling vital
military objectives among the civilian population. Indeed, the need to effectively strike such targets while minimizing risk to civilians and civilian
property has been a primary driving force behind the evolution of precision
stand-off strike capability.67

66. See Headquarters, Department of Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations 5–7 (1997), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/
source_materials/FM-101-5_staff_organization_and_operations.pdf.
67. Tim Cathcart, Standoff Ethics: Policy Considerations for the Use of Standoff Weapons, 2004
JOINT SERVICES CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, http://isme.tamu.edu
/JSCOPE04/Cathcart04.html.
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Because of this, it is almost inconceivable that States that possess or
aspire to these capabilities will be willing to commit to a complete ban on
their use whenever they fall into a restricted populated area. Indeed, it is in
these areas where the weapon systems will be considered to provide maximum operational advantage. And, based on the recognition that there will
never be a limitless supply of precision munitions, coupled with the expectation that future warfare will be increasingly urban in nature,68 it is equally
unlikely that States will commit to even a limited or partial ban on the use
of such weapons. However, in the improbable event some restriction on
such weapons does gain momentum, it is almost inevitable these States will
direct the regulatory focus not on the means of warfare, but the method of
use. For example, a more limited approach might seek to restrict the use of
“dumb” munitions in a populated area when fires are unobserved, or might
seek to restrict the use of “dumb” munitions altogether.69
It is apparent, however, that these types of restrictions would favor
technologically advanced armed forces. Because of this, other opponents
would perceive them as inequitable, undermining the likelihood they would
be adopted or respected. Any belligerent group unable to field the type of
capability or employ the type of tactics allowing for the use of indirect fires
in populated areas in accordance with technologically focused regulation
would seek to leverage its more limited capability to achieve, as best it
could, tactical and operational parity with the more advanced opponent.
This has been a common aspect of contemporary warfare. Ultimately, the
efficacy of a total or even partial restriction option is dubious because of
these considerations: it is almost inconceivable that States fielding advanced military capabilities will forego the opportunity to employ precision
stand-off strike capabilities; and it is equally inconceivable to expect that
less advanced opponents will forego leveraging all available combat resources to achieve tactical and operational parity in response to a more advanced military opponent.
Implementing and enforcing a total or limited restriction option is the
third significant flaw in this approach. Implementation will require clear
68. See Borrie & Brehm, supra note 62, at 812–17.
69. These types of “method” restrictions are more likely to be tolerable to States that
routinely impose similar restrictions on their own forces as a matter of policy, for example
through imposition of restrictive rules of engagement (although it must be noted that even
these ROE-based restrictions, while common in contemporary conflict, are often qualified
by allowing for exceptions when friendly forces are in direct contact and no other viable
option is available to protect them).
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definitions of both the weapons falling within the constraint and the context in which they are restricted. Starting with the context challenge, what
qualifies as a “populated area”? This has always been a difficult question in
relation to rules of engagement (ROE) -based restrictions on the use of indirect fires.70 In the ROE context the military commander imposing the
restriction is vested with the discretion to define “populated area” on a
mission-by-mission basis,71 but no such flexibility could feasibly be incorporated into a legal ban or restriction. Instead, that approach would require
consensus on the definition of populated or civilian area.
Modern warfare is increasingly urban in nature, and this is especially
true in the context of NIACs.72 Non-State belligerent groups are likely to
continue, and perhaps increase, reliance on close proximity to civilian population centers to sustain their efforts.73 This will produce a high probability that operational centers of gravity in these conflicts will be in areas
where civilians and civilian property are located. At what point would the
presence of civilians or civilian property in proximity to lawful objects of
attack trigger a restriction or prohibition on indirect fires or other high explosive munitions? If the answer is “anytime,” the definition would essentially nullify the effectiveness of these weapon systems—when properly
employed—to address what are frequently some of the most valuable targets in the conflict. If the answer is anything other than “anytime,” it produces an inherent inconsistency, because it tolerates subjecting some civilians to risk while protecting others contingent on where they happen to be
located at any given time. Thus, unlike the ROE approach, which tailors
restrictions to the variables of mission, enemy, time, resources and overall
civilian risk assessment, any complete prohibition would have to be founded on a “populated area” judgment, which will almost inevitably be overbroad and under-inclusive at the same time, including areas where the operational necessity for use of indirect fires objectively outweighs civilian
70. See John R. McQueney Jr., MACV’s Dilemma: Changes for the United States and the
Conduct of War on the Ground in Vietnam in 1968, in AN ARMY AT WAR: CHANGE IN THE
MIDST OF CONFLICT 255 (John J. McGarth ed., 2005) (describing the uncertainty surrounding the definitions of “populated area” and “urban area” within the rules of engagement).
71. See INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 84–87
(2012) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr
/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2012.pdf.
72. See Borrie & Brehm, supra note 62, at 812–17.
73. See id.
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risk based on existing targeting norms, and excluding less populated areas
where risk to civilians is still significant.
Enforcement of such a prohibition will present equally complex challenges. As noted above, because such an approach will seek to restrict the
use of weapon systems commonly included within the arsenal of most belligerent parties (as opposed to eliminating the weapon systems altogether),
there will be immense pressure on commanders and other operational decision makers to employ these systems in response to perceived operational
necessity. Expecting belligerents to forego the advantages offered by indirect fires and other high explosive munitions in populated areas is unrealistic, because the expectation fails to account for the military advantage consideration of the utilization equation. Where there is little military advantage to be gained by such use, there is, of course, a higher probability of
compliance. But where the advantage lies in using these weapon systems,
the temptation to use them will be immense, and compliance far less likely.
Enforcement of such a use prohibition will therefore present significant practical challenges, challenges that will be exacerbated whenever the
prohibition is perceived as fundamentally inconsistent with military operational considerations. Compliance with rules related to means and methods
of warfare is significantly enhanced when the effect of such rules is aligned
with military operational logic. This balance is manifested in numerous
provisions of customary and conventional IHL. Examples include military
necessity,74 military objective,75 proportionality76 and the authority to preventively detain enemy belligerents.77 Even humanitarian obligations serve
an underlying military utilitarian purpose. These protections are derived
from the reasoned judgment of the profession of arms that unnecessary
violence, destruction and suffering will ultimately undermine the strategic
74. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 11 (“military necessity justifies the use of force required to accomplish a lawful mission”).
75. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 52(2), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”).
76. See id., art. 57 (requiring parties to a conflict to “refrain from deciding to launch
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”).
77. See GC III, supra note 8.
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purpose of armed conflict: restoration of peace. Because armed forces are
primarily responsible for effective IHL implementation, IHL compliance
will invariably be facilitated where the dictates of the law comport with military operational considerations.
IHL is replete with examples of this symmetry between humanitarian
regulation and military operational logic. A quintessential example is the
prohibition against the infliction of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.78 This prohibition is a fundamental principle of the law, tracing its
roots back to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.79 By prohibiting the
calculated infliction of superfluous suffering or injury, the principle advances not only a humanitarian purpose, but also the military logic reflected in the concept of economy of force. There is no military value in wasting resources for the purpose of exacerbating the suffering of an opponent
already rendered combat ineffective, and this principle of law is consistent
with such logic. Another example is the rule restricting attacks only to military objectives. While there may be definitional uncertainty on the fringes
of the rule when it is operationally applied, the underlying premise is militarily sound: limiting the application of combat power to those persons,
places or things that contribute to achieving operational objectives. A resource conscience commander should instinctively avoid wasting resources
on targets of no operational or tactical significance, and this rule is consistent with that logic.
Most targeting rules fall within the scope of this symmetry because they
facilitate employing combat power in a manner that contributes to the
prompt submission of enemy military forces, while restricting the use of
such power when the effect will make little or no contribution to that objective. As a result, well-trained commanders and properly led subordinates
78. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering), (Jean-Marie Henckaerts &
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng
/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (“The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.”); Institute of International Law, Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on Land art. 9(a)
(1880), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 29 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Oxford Manual] (“It is forbidden [t]o employ arms, projectiles, or materials of any kind calculated to cause superfluous suffering, or to aggravate
wounds . . . .”).
79. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (stating as its object the barring of the “employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men,
or render their death inevitable”).
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are more likely to plan and conduct combat operations in an IHL compliant manner. However, this type of instinctive compliance is far less likely
when commanders perceive the impact of an IHL rule to be fundamentally
incompatible with basic military logic because it significantly compromises
the ability to bring enemy military forces into submission.
A total ban or even significant restriction against the use of indirect
fires and other high explosives in populated areas will fall into the latter
category, and almost certainly be perceived as attenuated from military logic. This is because use of indirect fires and other high explosives will often
be assessed as a weapon system to produce essential—if not decisive—
effects against enemy forces. As a result, effective enforcement will be
much more challenging than it is in relation to the existing IHL targeting
framework. And, considering that the record of compliance with even this
framework is less than ideal, the prospects are not good. This will likely
shift the implementation focus to post-hoc accountability. But this will only
add to the already substantial challenge of reliance on war crimes prosecutions as a primary focal point for NIAC IHL compliance.
The fourth significant flaw in the total or significant ban approach is
that it may actually be counterproductive, in fact increasing risk to civilians
and civilian property. If such a rule were adopted, it would create a very
high probability that operations in populated areas would involve ground
maneuver and close combat. FIBUA (Fighting in Built Up Areas) is the
current U.S. military doctrinal term for these types of operations, which are
also frequently referred to as MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain).80 It is precisely because such operations pose immense risk to both
friendly forces and civilians that commanders are trained to avoid this
method of warfare whenever operationally and legally feasible.81
Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to characterize this avoidance
principle as an axiom of military operational art. This is because engaging
an enemy in built up or urban terrain is considered among the most difficult combat situations a commander may encounter. Such operations cede
to the defender the natural advantage provided by the use of the urban ter80. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, at Glossary-2 (2006), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs
/dr_a/pdf/fm3_21x10.pdf (defining FIBUA); Headquarters, Department of the Army,
FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle, at Glossary-7 (1988), available at http://
www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm6-20(88).pdf (defining MOUT).
81. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, at I-8
(2013) [hereinafter Joint Pub. 3-60].
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rain for cover, concealment and overall tactical advantage.82 The built up
environment degrades the effectiveness of fires and maneuver.83 It also
creates an extremely high risk to civilians and civilian property in area of
hostilities, which adds an undesired element of uncertainty into the target
engagement process.84
History is replete with examples from which this principle is derived.
From Stalingrad to Hue to Fallujah, built up areas have historically been
considered the most undesired terrain on which to engage an enemy with
ground combat power.85 Nonetheless, for an attacking commander, there is
an unfortunate inverse relationship between built up areas and defensive
operations. Because of the difficulty of dislodging forces from such areas,
and the proximity to essential resources a defending commander derives
from built up areas, defenders obtain a force multiplication benefit from
emplacing positions in such areas.
Bypassing such areas is not always feasible, and when absolutely necessary assault into built up areas may have to occur. However, if alternatives
to ground assault are viable, a commander would be derelict in not considering and ultimately employing them. For example, a commander may
choose to use indirect fire assets to disrupt enemy forces in a built up area
during bypass operations, or to fix them in the area so that they cannot endanger friendly forces during the bypass. Or, a commander may need to
disrupt command and control and/or sustainment efforts emanating from
a built up area while concentrating forces on other objectives outside that
area. These are just two simplistic examples of the legitimate military advantage that might result from using fires as an alternative to ground maneuver to target enemy capabilities in built up areas; others abound. Depriving commanders of the indirect fires option will almost certainly result
in a significant increase in FIBUA operations. Because of the risk to civilians inherent in this alternative, the proverbial cure may actually be worse
than the disease.
While adding a new rule to the existing IHL targeting framework to
enhance protection of civilians and civilian property from the effects of
indirect fires and high explosives is, therefore, ill advised, the goal of enhancing civilian protection remains valid. A more effective approach is via82. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, at I-7
(2013), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_06.pdf.
83. See id. at I-6, I-7.
84. See id. at I-6.
85. See id. at I-3.
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ble: enhance the humanitarian effect of the existing IHL targeting framework. And the focal point of this approach is one word: reasonable.
B. Rethinking the Element of “Reasonableness” in the Implementation of IAC-Based
Targeting Norms
As noted above, the Tadić judgment concluded that many IHL treaty rules
developed for the regulation of IACs had over time “migrated” to the
realm of NIACs.86 Because of the overall paucity of targeting regulation
included in the NIAC treaty regime—Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions87 and Additional Protocol II88—this conclusion was widely
endorsed as a rational and justifiable approach to ensure the effective regulation of methods and means of warfare in the NIAC domain. And this has
indeed been a beneficial effect of the decision: the rule migration concept
has been instrumental in filling the vacuum of NIAC legal regulation. It
also provided support for the International Committee of the Red Cross’s
conclusion that many IAC-based targeting rules apply to NIAC as customary international law,89 a foundation for including targeting violations
among the ICC offenses applicable to NIACs. The conclusion that these
rules apply to NIACs is reflected in other authoritative sources, such as The
Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts.90
However, the Tadić opinion offered no insight into how the legal standards for targeting decisions should translate from one domain of armed
conflict to the other. At the core of lawful targeting is the touchstone of
reasonableness, a touchstone that defines the proper application of the
specific targeting rules. This is only logical, as these rules almost always involve the exercise of command or leadership judgment within the frame86. See supra text accompanying notes 2–5.
87. See GC I–IV, supra note 8, art. 3.
88. See AP II, supra note 9.
89. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 175, 189 (2005). Some examples of conduct of hostilities
rules applicable to NIAC include: prohibitions of attacks on civilians and on objects indispensible to the lives of civilians; prohibitions of starvation and of the forced movement of
the civilian population; and certain obligations to the wounded, sick and dead and to
women and children. Id. at 188.
90. See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY
3 (2006), available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20
the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf.
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work of a legal standard: a judgment that a nominated target qualifies as a
lawful military objective; a judgment that the use of precautionary measures
is not feasible under the circumstances; a judgment that the anticipated military advantage from an attack outweighs the anticipated risk of excessive
civilian injury or destruction of civilian property.91
Because reasonableness is central to compliance with IHL’s targeting
rules, providing greater clarity on the substantive meaning of this touchstone will contribute to effective implementation of the law’s objectives.
Unfortunately, its uncertain meaning continues to undermine the effectiveness of the law two decades after the Tadić decision. This uncertainty is especially problematic in NIACs. Unlike IACs, these conflicts often involve
belligerent groups that are not extensively trained and organized. Training
and organization are central to fielding a disciplined force, which in turn
contributes to IHL compliance.92 Thus, the nature of the groups engaged in
NIACs often dilutes IHL compliance confidence. And, because, as noted
above, IHL compliance incentives are simply not as significant in the NIAC context as they are in the IAC context, the reduced expectation of
compliance competence becomes even more problematic.
IHL compliance in NIACs requires greater clarity on the meaning of
reasonableness as it relates to IHL targeting compliance, and the relationship between the reasonableness of weapon employment and the preparation of subordinates for their combat tasks. As I attempted to explain in a
previous article, it is insufficient to state simply that targeting judgments
must be reasonable;93 that axiom is beyond question. What is far less certain is what indicates whether a particular judgment is, in fact, reasonable?
For example, what quantum of information justifies a reasonable judgment
of lawful military objective? Or what level of training justifies a judgment
that subordinate forces are reasonably prepared to execute their combat
mission in accordance with the law?
This clarity is particularly important in relation to the Tadić-based targeting rule migration. Extending IAC-derived targeting rules to NIACs
must also involve extending the IAC-based compliance related to these
91. See Joint Pub. 3-60, supra note 81, at I-7.
92. See Heike Krieger, A Turn to Non-State Actors: Inducing Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law in War-Torn Areas of Limited Statehood 9, 12–13 (SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 62, 2013), available at http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks
/files/371505569.pdf.
93. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 437 (2012).
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rules. It is here where greater attention offers genuine potential to clarify
the standard of reasonableness applicable to NIAC targeting decisions, and,
in turn, enhance protection of civilians and civilian property from the
harmful effects of indirect fires and other high explosives. More specifically, “reasonableness” should include a requirement that NIAC belligerents—most importantly armed group leaders—comply with the same practical aspects of law implementation as their IAC counterparts. This will
clarify the expectation of lawful use of highly lethal combat power, and
provide a more objective basis for accountability when these standards are
ignored.
IAC targeting norms were not developed in a vacuum. Instead, they
were informed by the practice of States that contributed to the evolution
and adoption of these rules.94 That practice almost always involved operations by regular armed forces. While levels of training and tactical competence vary widely from one nation to another (and even from one military
unit to another), the underlying premise of any national military force is
that it is organized, trained and prepared to execute its combat function.
The capacity to effectively employ the weapon systems fielded by the State
is central to this premise.95 Indeed, training to develop tactical competence
in the use of weapon systems is one of the unifying aspects of all military
training.96
IAC targeting rules were built upon this expectation. In other words,
the rules anticipated that those employing the weapon systems regulated by
the law would be at least minimally competent in their use. This is important, because employment competence is obviously linked to compliance with IHL targeting rules. Competence also involves leaders preparing
subordinates to execute their tactical mission in accordance with IHL expectations, which, in relation to indirect fires, means training subordinates
to mass their explosive effects on military objectives and minimize the collateral effects.
94. See Oxford Manual, supra note 78, preface, at 30 (“By [codifying the rules of war
derived from State practice], [it is] rendering a service to military men themselves . . . .”).
95. See JAMES C. CROWLEY ET AL., CHANGING THE ARMY’S WEAPON TRAINING
STRATEGIES TO MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS MORE EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY 1 (2014), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_
reports/RR400/RR448/RAND_RR448.pdf (“The ability of soldiers to engage the enemy
is fundamental to operational success. As a result, the U.S. Army devotes considerable unit
effort and resources to weapon training.”).
96. Id.
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Targeting reasonableness should, therefore, be linked to competence in
the tactical employment of lethal weapon systems and the preparation of
forces to utilize these weapon systems in an IHL compliant manner. The
expectation that lethal indirect fires will be employed in accordance with
these conditions should be recognized as a component of reasonableness.
Reasonableness is always assessed contextually; it is therefore necessary to
consider the context in which targeting decisions are made. But this does
not reduce the reasonableness assessment to a purely subjective standard.
Instead, commanders are held to an objective standard of reasonable conduct assessed by considering the context in which the judgment was made.
This assessment methodology supports imposing IAC-based employment
standards on NIAC belligerents. While the unique tactical and operational
considerations in each particular conflict will inform the assessment of reasonableness, that assessment must ultimately reflect an objective standard
of tactical competence, and, because the rules that frame lawful application
of lethal combat power are derived from the law developed in the IAC
domain, the IAC objective standard of tactical competence should accompany that migration.
Indeed, evidence that a commander diligently prepared subordinate
forces in both tactical competence and an understanding of, and commitment to, IHL compliance during mission execution is probative of the reasonableness of the ultimate attack decisions. Unfortunately, the Tadić opinion never emphasized that the migration of the IHL rules from one domain of armed conflict to the other necessitated a concurrent migration of
IAC standards of reasonableness.97 Doing so is long overdue.
Considering the training, competence, and preparation of personnel entrusted with lethal combat power as a factor when assessing the reasonableness of targeting judgments provides a rational basis to prohibit the use
of indirect fire systems by untrained or poorly trained belligerent groups
who have possession of such weapon systems, a common occurrence in
NIACs. It will also signal to leaders of these groups that training is an internationally demanded pre-condition to utilization of such weapon systems, and those leaders who authorize employment by poorly or untrained
subordinates risk criminal responsibility for breaching their command responsibility. And, because external State sponsors frequently provide these
systems to non-State belligerent groups, it might lead these sponsors to
devote great effort to train end users on the proper employment of these
97. Tadić, supra note 2.
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weapon systems. Furthermore, it might also enhance international legal accountability for the providing State, especially where it is foreseeable that
the recipient group is unprepared to employ the weapon system in accordance with IHL obligations.
Linking reasonableness with IAC-based standards of tactical competence will also significantly contribute to accountability. This is because the
objective component of the assessment of targeting reasonableness will be
based on IAC competence standards.98 By subjecting NIAC targeting to
these IAC standards, the law will signal to NIAC belligerents that they may
only utilize proverbial “grown up” means of warfare when they have developed maturity in competence to employ those weapons in accordance
with “grown up” standards. It will also facilitate the critique of lethal targeting in NIACs by providing a more commonly adhered to baseline of objective competence.
Focusing on employment competence will also increase the relevance
of military operational expertise in defining and assessing the reasonableness of targeting judgments in NIACs. This will enhance universal recognition and understanding of the substantive scope of regulatory rules. While
establishing the legal framework for targeting will always necessitate reliance on legal expertise,99 assessing compliance with the law must include
the contribution of military operational experts. The perspective of such experts adds the proverbial flesh to the bones of the legal framework, providing the objective “societal” standard of conduct against which to judge a
particular incident.
The relevance and significance of military operational experts in the
development and assessment of the concept of reasonableness in relation
to lethal targeting has, unfortunately, been generally overlooked. During
the past several decades, legal experts have assumed an increasingly central
role in this definitional process.100 However, even when these experts possess some background in military operational art, rarely will they possess a
level of expertise analogous to military personnel who have devoted their
profession to the practice of military operations. Assessing what qualifies as
a reasonable attack judgment within the meaning of IHL targeting law
must reflect a synthesis between legal and operational expertise, and
98. See Corn, Life of the Law, supra note 48, at 9–12.
99. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 377. See also AP I, supra
note 75, art. 82 (“The High Contracting Parties at all times . . . shall ensure that legal advisors are available, when necessary . . . .”).
100. See Corn & Corn, supra note 58, at 342.
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providing a more significant role for operational experts will contribute to
this objective.
Unfortunately, the lack of clarity on the meaning of targeting reasonableness has contributed to what I have characterized elsewhere as “effectsbased analysis.”101 Because the effects of combat operations are much more
easily visualized and critiqued than is the combat decision-making process,
it is almost inevitable that investigations, and even prosecutions, will increasingly focus on destructive targeting effects. This effects-based focus,
however, is inconsistent with fundamental tenets of the law, which demand
reasonable combat judgments, which must be assessed contextually, and
not based on retrospective analysis. While effects-based critique and condemnation may be an inevitable reality of the intersection of war, media
and the public conscience, it must not become the standard by which military decision makers are judged for their operational and tactical decisions.
The risk of effects-based adjudications may be mitigated when the alleged
war crimes are so blatant that there is no meaningful debate over the objective reasonableness of command judgments. However, as allegations of
battlefield misconduct trend away from the blatantly unlawful to complex
tactical and operational judgments, this risk is substantially more palpable.
Effects are probative in that they provide circumstantial evidence that
is relevant to assess targeting reasonableness. But they are not conclusive.
Effects must be considered along with the totality of all other relevant information when assessing targeting legality, such as tactical competence,
training, preparation and other indications of good faith commitment to
IHL compliance. This aspect of the legality critique is not within the exclusive, or perhaps even primary, domain of international legal experts. Military operational experts are, in contrast, highly competent to offer insight
into how these aspects of mission execution reflect on the overall legality
assessment. Emphasis on the relationship between these aspects of military
operations and the ultimate touchstone of reasonableness will enhance the
contributions of such experts, and, over time, provide greater clarity to
“what right looks like.”
C. The Ukrainian Illustration
Two aspects of the armed conflict in Ukraine illustrate the potential benefit
of extending operational practice standards and IHL targeting rules to NI101. See Corn, Life of the Law, supra note 48, at 2.
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ACs: the Malaysian Air aircraft shoot down and the use of indirect fires in
populated areas.
By most credible accounts, Ukrainian rebels, utilizing an advanced air
defense missile system, were responsible for the shoot down of Malaysian
Air Flight 17.102 In the unlikely event any of the responsible actors are
brought to trial for this tragedy, they will not be able to credibly assert that
they engaged a lawful military target. Instead, it is likely they will respond to
any accusation of unlawful attack by asserting they made a reasonable error
in judgment: they believed the airliner was a lawful object of attack, a belief
that, although mistaken, was reasonable under the circumstances due to the
use of the same airspace by Ukrainian military aircraft.
There is evidence to support the conclusion that this was a deliberate
attack on a known civilian airliner;103 evidence which could lead to a relatively easy finding of an unlawful deliberate attack on civilians and civilian
property. But if the question of reasonable mistake were to arise, the relative tactical competence and preparation of the forces employing the
weapon system should play an important role in this assessment. In other
words, merely utilizing the system without sufficient training and preparation could itself establish the unreasonableness of the employment judgment. This is because this type of mistake is a foreseeable consequence of
fielding advanced combat capability without properly training forces to use
that capability in compliance with IHL obligations. And how would the
adequacy of the pre-employment preparation be assessed? Ideally by comparing the actual preparation with the preparation utilized by professional
military forces engaged in an IAC. Ultimately, the reasonableness of any
alleged targeting error should be significantly influenced by the extent of
the difference between these two standards.
Use of indirect fires, most notably GRAD missiles, in densely populated areas provides another illustration of the relevance of IAC employment
standards in the assessment of targeting legality. Reports indicated that
both rebel and government forces have periodically fired GRAD surfaceto-surface missiles with high-explosive warheads into densely populated
areas.104 As with the Malaysian Air shoot down, a clear violation of the IHL
102. Catherine E. Shoichet & Ashley Fantz, U.S. Official: Missile Shot Down Malaysia
Airlines Plane, CNN (July 18, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/europe/uk
raine-malaysia-airlines-crash/.
103. Id.
104. Ukraine: Unguided Rockets Killing Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 24, 2014),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/ukraine-unguided-rockets-killing-civilians.
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rule of distinction would be established by proof these attacks were deliberately directed at civilians and/or civilian property. It is more likely, however, that they were directed at what the attacking commander determined
were military objectives located in the midst of the civilian population.
Where this was the case, the assessment of legality will turn on the reasonableness of several critical judgments.
First, there is the judgment that the target would qualify as a lawful military objective.105 Second, there is the judgment that it would not be feasible
to use an alternate means or method of warfare that would reduce civilian
risk and achieve the intended tactical effect.106 Third, there is the judgment
that the anticipated incidental civilian harm would not be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage.107 And finally, there is the
judgment that use of surface-to-surface missiles in that context would not
be inherently indiscriminate, i.e., that the weapon could be directed to a
specific military target with sufficient precision.108
These attacks have caused substantial harm to civilians and civilian
property. Indeed, their adverse effects have contributed to the momentum
building for completely banning the use of such weapons in populated areas. But as noted above, “effects-based condemnation” may be appealing,
but is inconsistent with the IHL targeting regime. Reasonableness must be
the critical focal point to assess compliance with this regime. The target
identification and engagement procedures and training standards for weapon systems operators used by regular armed forces engaged in IACs provide a useful baseline for this assessment. This baseline is objective, because it is grounded in the practice of armed forces equipped with this type
of lethal weaponry. By relying on military operational expertise, it is also a
feasible baseline to develop during investigations and criminal prosecutions. Finally, it is a credible baseline, because condemnation for use—
stemming from an objectively defective judgment related to any of the key
legal questions implicated by the use of this weaponry—would be based on
deviation from accepted operational practices. Importantly, this would include the reasonableness of unleashing these weapon systems without adequate target legality assessment, training of operators and command oversight of mission execution.
105. For an overview of the military targeting process and its relationship to LOAC,
see Corn & Corn, supra note 58.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Armed conflicts are by their very nature among the most brutal collective
endeavors known to human society. But all is not fair in war, and conflict
regulation is deeply rooted in international law. During the past century,
this law has seen the balance of interests between State sovereignty and
protection of humanity shift gradually, yet continuously, in favor of the
protection of war victims. And, perhaps because non-international armed
conflicts have become the predominant form of warfare, this trend inspired the extension of conflict regulatory norms originally developed for
inter-State warfare into this pervasive domain of brutal hostilities.
This extension has been essential to build a foundation for both regulation of these conflicts and accountability for participants whose conduct
transgresses international legal standards. Unfortunately, the aspiration behind this extension—to enhance the protection of war victims by demanding respect for core conduct of hostilities rules during any armed conflict—
has been frustrated by an overall failure of compliance. The track record of
international humanitarian law violations—brutality, excessive uses of
force, unlawful targeting and other violations of basic international humanitarian law obligations—associated with these armed conflicts is so pervasive that it almost numbs international reaction. Regrettably, the excesses in
the Ukrainian conflict are not exceptional, but just the most recent example
of the continuing divide between the NIAC conflict regulation aspiration
and reality.
Improving this state of affairs is essential, but the solution is not new
law, or arbitrary and unrealistic prohibitions on the use of widely available
combat capabilities such as artillery and rocket assets. Instead, incentives
for compliance must be reconceived, disincentives for non-compliance enhanced and standards of compliance with conduct of hostilities norms better defined, most notably how compliance with the central touchstone of
reasonableness in targeting judgments should be assessed. This article has
suggested several approaches along these lines.
New approaches are needed to close the gulf between the aspiration of
more effective NIAC regulation that is central to the Tadić decision, and
the reality of humanitarian suffering that continues to define these conflicts. There is, however, no easy solution to this problem of international
law non-compliance during NIACs, and these suggestions are no panacea.
Yet they are responsive to the realities of these all-too-common armed
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conflicts, and the axiom that it is always error to reinforce failure. If nothing else, it is hoped they will stimulate new ideas that may ultimately produce a reality consistent with aspiration.
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